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Abstract:  Copyright is at  the centre of both popular and academic debate.
That emotions are running high is hardly surprising - copyright influences who
contributes what to culture, how culture is used, and even the kind of persons
we are and come to be. Consequentialist,  Lockean, and personality  interest
accounts are generally advanced in the literature to morally justify copyright
law. I critically discuss these and come to the conclusion that only very limited
authorial control of works is morally justified: Lockean accounts (including
Nozick's) fail to ground moral rights in intellectual creations. If one accepts
that  copyright  is  not  the  only means of  remunerating  authors,  then  neither
public interests  nor authorial  personality interests  justify more than a small
subset of the rights accorded by copyright law. The pared-down version of
copyright that I defend consists of the right to attribution, the right to have
one's  non-endorsement  of  modifications  or  uses  of  one's  works  explicitly
noted,  and  the  right  to  a  share  of  the  profit  that  may  result  from  the
commercial  uses  of  one's  works.  Importantly,  this  last  right  must  be
implemented so that it does not grant the author the ability to boycott any uses.
These rights hinder neither public nor authorial interests and advance at least
one  of  the  two.  Additionally,  I  defend  the  importance  of  non-copyright
compensation systems that ensure that authors are financially compensated for
their valuable work. I also cursorily explore whether contribution to another
person's authorial work gives rise to moral interests.
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Introduction
Interest in copyright has ebbed and flowed ever since its inception more than three
hundred years  ago.1 The  debates  brought  on by the  tidal  wave of  digitisation  are
however  of  a  rare  intensity.  Copyright  holders  sue  their  own  customers  in  the
thousands.2 Authors  decry  the  public's  unwillingness  to  respect  their  "right  to  the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from [their work]" as set down
in article 27 of the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Others – consumers as
well as authors – decry the culture industry's monopoly on human creativity; a worry
about which the famous Twitter persona Nein succinctly tweeted: "Another beautiful
day  for  the  Culture  Industry.  For  culture,  not  so  much."3.  Users  of  unlicensed
copyrighted material are labelled pirates, a word that carries connotations of robbery,
violence,  and anarchy. In retaliation, the term been re-appropriated and users have
gone on to found political parties that advance their views: the pirate parties. These
parties see themselves as part of wider culture of collaborative creation and creative
re-use, which finds copyright protection to be hindering their efforts of attaining a
more cooperative, democratic, and “bottom-up” mode of production.4 Copyright, in
short, is at the forefront of public discourse.
What  was  "once  taken  for  granted  as  morally  legitimate"5 is  now  up  for
discussion. While balancing authorial with public interests is as essential today as it
has been for centuries, computerisation and the internet present us with radically new
ways of resolving this tension. The renewed debate on copyright has led to a decline
in  relative  importance  of  the  more  technical  matters  of  copyright  law,  benefiting
fundamental discussions of the permissibility of copyright protection and the form
and scope of a moral regulation of authorial works.
The  literature  on  the  ethics  of  copyright  largely  adheres  to  a  distinction
between three different approaches: a utilitarian approach (sometimes replaced by a
value pluralist  consequentialism),  accounts  based on the Lockean theory of labour
desert, and lastly personality interest theories fashioned after Hegel (and sometimes
Kant).6 A combination of two factors renders this separation problematic. Firstly, the
approaches  are  presented  as  clearly  distinct  and  stemming  from  fundamentally
different  streams  of  thought.  While  there  is  ample  criticism  of  each  individual
approach, there is little research on the interactions between the different approaches.
Secondly, only few philosophers argue that a single approach is sufficient to morally
1 The enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1710 is generally seen as the origin of the modern notion of 
copyright.
2 Kravets, D., 2008. File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 Years of RIAA Litigation. Wired.com. 
Available at: http://www.wired.com/2008/09/proving-file-sh/ [Accessed April 3, 2014].
3 Nein, 2013. Another beautiful day for the culture industry. for culture, not so much. Twitter.com. 
Available at: https://twitter.com/NeinQuarterly/status/373772028069044224 [Accessed September 
24, 2013].
4 Aigrain, P., 2012. Sharing: Culture and the Economy in the Internet Age, Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press.
5 Himma, K.E., 2008. The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes. 
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 59(7), pp.1143–1161, p.1143.
6 For examples of this separation see Moore or Hughes. Moore, A., 2008. Personality-Based, Rule-
Utilitarian, and Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property. In K. E. Himma & H. Tavani, eds. The 
Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pp. 105–130. Hughes, J., 1988. 
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Georgetown Law Journal, 77, pp.287–366.
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justify  copyright.7 Most  proponents  of  copyright  think a  combination  of  the  three
arguments  can  compensate  for  their  individual  weaknesses.  However,  while  an
approach focusing on the different accounts individually might be suited to show what
speaks for each approach  per se,  it  does  not  lend itself  to  the establishment  of  a
general account of the morality of copyright.
In this paper I try to sketch a big picture account of the morality of copyright,
analysing the key strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. I hope to show
that the case for copyright is far weaker than often assumed and that a weighing of the
different interests is more likely to come out in favour of a substantially reduced set of
rights for authors. I propose a set of rights that I believe is in accordance with the
moral interests at stake.
In the next section I will set down the basic principles of copyright law, in
section three I analyse public interests, in section four Lockean approaches, and in
section five personality interest accounts. Section six investigates what rights these
interests  give  rise  to,  section  seven  looks  at  contributors,  and  the  last  section
concludes.
Copyright law
Arguments for and against copyright suffer from a notorious problem – there
is no single thing called copyright. In fact, there exists not only a myriad of currently
existing legal systems but also a spade of previously prevalent systems and of course
an abundance of theoretically possible systems. And they all have a claim to the term
copyright.8 In the following I define a minimal copyright system: a system exhibiting
a number of principles that are defined in international law or present in (almost) all
jurisdictions.9
The purpose of this exercise is to force the moving target that copyright is to
hold still. A successful attack on the minimal copyright system does not necessarily
imply that all copyright systems are morally unjustified – additional principles could
still  improve  copyright's  lot.  However,  by  showing  that  copyright  is  morally
problematic at its core, I hope to show that it is unlikely to be rescued by additional
ad-hoc principles. Defining the basic principles should also help us pinpoint exactly
where copyright goes wrong and what features a non-copyright regulation of authorial
works might have. I want to stress that I have no interest in semantic squabbles – if
you think the principles I define towards the end of this paper constitute copyright,
then so be it.
7 Resnik, D.B., 2003. A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property. Journal of Business Ethics, 46(4), 
pp.319–335.
8 Even though I will be using the Anglo-Saxon term copyright throughout this paper, I do not mean to 
thereby exclude systems employing a different terminology (e.g. droit d'auteur). The applicability of 
my argument is limited only by the definition contained in this section.
9 The most important and widely ratified international treaties on copyright are the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic (Berne Convention) from 1886 (last revision in 1971), the 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations (Rome Convention) from 1961, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) from 1994.
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In  order  to  define  the  minimal  copyright  system  two  aspects  need  to  be
explored: (a) the subject matter of copyright and (b) the rights granted by copyright.
The  subject  matter  defines  to  which  works  copyright  applies,  whereas  the  rights
granted define the bundle of rights accorded to the author of such works.
The  scope  of  the  subject  matter  of  copyright  is  very  wide.  The  Berne
Convention defines  as  copyrightable  every  type  of  "production  in  the  literary,
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression".10
The argument that I develop in this paper applies to everything that is copyrightable:
texts,  movies,  songs,  sculptures,  paintings,  photographs,  software and much more.
Most countries rely on the concept of originality to determine whether a certain work
is protected by copyright.11 Originality is a concept "fiendishly difficult to define"12
but this need not concern us; at this point it is enough to understand that in today's
copyright law originality requires that a work of authorship exhibit a minimal level of
creativity.13
Minimal degree of creativity: copyrightable works need to exhibit a 
minimal degree of creativity. 
The notion of expression is also essential to any conception of copyright. Only
expressions are copyrightable, thereby excluding ideas, methods, functions and facts
from being the subject of copyright.14 This can be illustrated by the fact that only the
text of a book can be copyrighted but not the ideas expressed therein.
Idea/expression dichotomy: only expressions are copyrightable.
When it comes to the rights accorded by copyright, the matter is complicated
by the fact that there are economic rights as well as moral rights. In most jurisdictions
moral rights are considered a separate body of rights or might not exist at all.
Economic  rights  can  be  transferred  and  are  thus  tradable  on  the  market.
Historically, the right to make copies was the first such right. To this right many more
have  been  added  since,  for  example  the  right  to  modify  a  work,  the  right  to
communicate a work to the public, and more. I focus on the three rights I have just
explicitly  mentioned as they are the most basic.  However,  I believe my argument
applies to all existing economic rights, and as such a different selection of minimal
economic rights should not affect my assertions.
Minimal economic rights: copyright protects for a limited amount of time 
one or more of the following transferable rights: the right to make and 
10 Cited in : Dutfield, G., 2008. Global Intellectual Property Law, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, p.78.
11  Abbott, F.M., Cottier, T. & Gurry, F., 2011. International Intellectual Property in an Integrated 
World Economy 2nd ed., New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.
12   Dutfield. Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit., p.79.
13 I do not intend to exclude systems that use a standard different from, but similar to, creativity. My 
notion of creativity should be seen as very thin and encompassing the US American legal notion of 
creativity, British copyrightability notions of skill and judgement as well as the continental European 
concepts of creative choice, intellectual contribution and again creativity.
14  Abbott et al. International Intellectual Property in an Integrated World Economy, op. cit.
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distribute copies, the right to communicate a work to the public, and the 
right to make modifications.
Only  economic  rights  are  part  of  my  definition  of  the  minimal  copyright
system as moral  rights  only exist  in some jurisdictions  and always in  addition  to
economic  rights.  Moral  rights  cannot  usually  be  transferred  and  may  hold  in
perpetuity. My criticism of copyright applies to most moral rights, too. While I retain
the right of attribution – the right to be named as the author of one's works – I do
argue against the second important moral right: the right of integrity. This right allows
authors to object to modifications of their works that endanger their reputation.
Both economic and moral rights are held by the author alone; she can exclude
anyone from using or appropriating her works. Non-authors do not enjoy any of the
copyrights, except if these are transferred to them by the author. 
Exclusivity: economic and moral rights must be exclusive to the author.
Public interest arguments
Our lives are inextricably intertwined with copyrighted works, used daily by
probably a majority of the human population. We listen to music, read books, use
word processors to write  academic papers,  consult  written manuals,  and go to the
cinema.  I  believe  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  use  of  copyrighted  works
increases our welfare – why would people go to such lengths and incur such costs to
acquire them otherwise? According to the public interest view, it is this increase in
welfare that justifies copyright. It is not because of authors but because of the general
public that we need to protect authors.
The argument can be summarised as follows: Copyright allows authors to use
the power of the law to exclude people from using their works. This enables authors
to gain financially from the sale of of their copyright or of copies of their works.
Because  of  these  financial  incentives  authors  produce  a  higher  volume or  higher
quality of works, and the public benefits from these works because authors will – for a
fee – grant access to them. The negative effects of the fee barring some people from
accessing the works they desire is counterbalanced by the positive effect on those
users who have access to works that would not have come into existence without
copyright.15
I now turn to the plausibility of the premises necessary for the validity of the
above argument. I have organised these into three groups. The first group is the most
obvious  and  is  considered  by  most  welfare-based  accounts  and  by  my argument
sketched above. The second is a necessary but often forgotten addition to the welfarist
approach and the third goes beyond welfare and considers additional public interests.
The need for the first three premises should be clear from my description of
15 Furthermore, to minimise the negative effects on those who are not able to use copyrighted works, 
most regulatory systems provide for exceptions to the rights they grant. Sometimes called fair use or 
limitations and exceptions, these aim to ensure that the public does not suffer unduly high costs and 
that authors do not misuse their powers. Dutfield. Global Intellectual Property Law, op. cit.
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the welfarist argument.
(C1) Copyright enables authors to benefit financially from their works.
(C2) Potential financial benefit acts as an incentive to authors to produce a
higher quantity or quality of authorial works.
(C3) The consumer and producer benefits caused by copyright outweigh 
the consumer and producer harm.
Does copyright enable financial profit for authors as stated in (C1)? Copyright
restores  excludability  and  thus  enables  authors  to  ask  for  and  receive  monetary
compensation for access to their works. In many economic sectors there is little doubt
that  copyright  does  benefit  authors  tremendously.  However,  in  other  sectors  there
exist powerful middle men who can siphon off the profits. For instance, only twelve
percent of musicians' income in the United States derives directly from copyright with
the highest earners taking home most of the share.16 Where authors do not currently
profit from copyright, it can be argued that this not because of copyright per se. If the
market mechanisms were to be relevantly regulated, it might be possible to correct the
current  power  differentials  between  authors  and  content  providers.  In  conclusion,
copyright does enable at least some authors to benefit financially from their works.
However, the real benefit must be critically assessed, taking into consideration that
many authors do not benefit financially – or only benefit marginally – from copyright.
I believe two things are clear when it comes to premise (C2): Firstly, authorial
works are  not  created  for pecuniary  gain alone.  Many authors do not  profit  from
copyright  but  produce  works  regardless.17 Secondly,  financial  gain  has  an
incentivising  effect  on  many  producers.18 The  precise  role  monetary  and  non-
monetary incentives play in the production of a specific work depends both on the
author as well as the work's characteristics. However, it is clear that financial benefits
do act as incentives for at least some authors. And because it is  potential financial
benefits  that  incentivise  authors,  copyright  can  be  effective  also  when  only  few
authors profit in practice. I therefore sustain premise (C2).
Premise (C3) is where the economic calculus becomes complex indeed. A first
step in appraising (C3) consists in adding the consumer and producer surplus achieved
by a higher quantity and quality of authorial works. The uncertainties regarding (C1)
and (C2) have already shown some of this task's difficulties. Additionally, we need to
16 DiCola, P., 2013. Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons about 
Copyright Incentives. Arizona Law Review, 55, p.301.
17 This points elicits more scepticism than I think it deserves. Many authors derive their income from 
non-copyright sources (e.g. programmers working with open source software), explicitly forgo 
copyright protection (e.g. artists using Creative Commons licenses), or simply do not earn money – or 
only very little – from the copyright in their works. See for example: Kretschmer, M. & Hardwick, P., 
2007. Authors’ earnings from copyright and non-copyright sources: A survey of 25,000 British and 
German writers, Poole, UK: Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management.
18 Douglas, G. et al., 1998. Are Financial Incentives Related to Performance? A Meta-Analytic Review 
of Empirical Research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(5), pp.777–787. Ryan, R.M. & Deci, E.L., 
2000. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions and New Directions. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 25(1), pp.54–67.
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factor in the costs caused by higher prices – these entail that people who would have
benefited from access to authorial works that would have been produced even without
copyright and who do not have the financial means to pay for them are left with less
welfare  with  copyright  than  without.  Furthermore,  costs  of  legislation  and
enforcement  need  to  be  considered.  There  is  also  evidence  that  some  forms  of
monetary incentives crowd out non-monetary incentives, which if true for authorial
works, means the positive effects of copyright on the monetary incentives postulated
in premise (C2) are counteracted by negative effects on other forms of incentives.19
Additionally, producers themselves can be harmed by copyright when they desire to
base their  works on prior and copyrighted works. The empirical  debate about this
calculus has raged for a very long time, and there has so far been no comprehensive
victory  for  either  side.20 We are  thus  left  in  empirical  limbo  with  regard  to  this
premise.
The  challenges  faced  by  the  public  interest  theorist  are  formidable  when
considering  premises  (C1),  (C2),  and  (C3).  And,  to  make  matters  worse,  the
proponent of copyright needs to supplement these premises with:
(C4) The welfare calculus of alternative compensation systems is worse 
than copyright's.
Premise (C4) is necessary because copyright is not the only means by which
the production of authorial works can be financially incentivised. This premise often
remains  hidden  and  its  truth  assumed  when  the  usefulness  of  copyright  is,  for
instance,  demonstrated  with  copyright's  contribution  to  GDP.  Possible
implementations of alternative compensation systems are currently hotly debated in
the field of economics.21 These schemes can be divided into two groups: compulsory
government-mandated  contribution  schemes  and  voluntary  contribution  schemes.
Both have their advantages and disadvantages, and a non-copyright system might also
use a combination of some of these schemes to provide effective monetary incentives.
What is more, an alternative system need not necessarily be as effective at providing
monetary  incentives  as the copyright  system. If  the costs  associated  with such an
alternative system are lower than in the copyright system, then this has to be factored
in, too. What is more, already today not all monetary incentives to authors are due to
copyright. It must also be noted that the less clear premises (C1), (C2), and (C3) work
in copyright's favour, the more difficult it becomes to argue that (C4) is true.
There is clearly no consensus among economists on whether copyright is the
best way to boost the production of authorial works. However, if anything, there is a
tendency of  doubt  about  copyright's  usefulness.  Moore – referring  to  the work of
Machlup, Priest, and Long – writes: "Economists who have considered the question
indicate that either the jury is out, or that other arrangements [than copyright] would
be better".22 Even if I cannot conclusively reject the truth of premise (C4), it is clear
that the proponent of copyright has a lot of work to do to turn it into an argument that
19 Moore. Personality-Based, Rule-Utilitarian, and Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property, op. 
cit.
20 Abbott et al. International Intellectual Property in an Integrated World Economy, op. cit.
21 Liebowitz, S.J. & Watt, R., 2006. How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for 
Music? Copyright and Its Alternatives. Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(4), pp.513–545.
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can lend strength to her point of view.
Finally,  the  welfare  economic  argument  needs  to  fend  off  two  additional
attacks. Firstly, market relations might not be the only relevant way in which one can
analyse welfare. Secondly, there might be values other than welfare that are important
in assessing what policies are good for individuals and society. The first argument is
about how to measure welfare and says that, for instance, power relations and non-
market factors need to be considered, too. The second argument proposes a value-
pluralist account.
(C5) The overall effect on the attainment of moral values is better in the 
copyright system than in all other regulatory system.
Under the above premise it  remains  possible  to claim that  we should only
strive for economic welfare, but now an argument for such a claim must be supplied. I
will  content  myself  with  supplying  some  hints  about  why  such  an  argument  is
difficult,  and  why  value-pluralism  makes  the  argument  for  copyright  even  more
onerous. For example, utilitarianism does not consider the importance of the diversity
of works for people's ability of self-expression and personal development. There are
indications that the top-down distribution symptomatic of a culture industry based on
copyright  reduces diversity.23 Another  point is made by Gillespie,  who writes that
"[c]opyright is at the heart of cultural policy – those rules that help to govern what is
said, by whom, and with what effect".24 With copyright, authors, copyright holders,
and  the  financially  well-off  have  a  favoured  access  to  works  and  are  thus  in  a
privileged  position  when  it  comes  to  deciding  on  the  future  development  of  our
culture and associated values. Distributive justice is also clearly affected by copyright,
as those without the necessary means cannot access copyrighted works. This not only
lowers  their  welfare  but  also  bars  them  from acquiring  information  necessary  to
improving their situation.25
To conclude, I believe (value-pluralist) consequentialism draws our attention
to important concerns about copyright. I hope to have shown that it is very difficult to
make a  conclusive  argument  for  copyright  using  such an  approach,  and there  are
strong indicators that consequentialism favours alternatives to the copyright system.
Lockean approaches
I will now turn my attention to those who lend their name to the French droit
d'auteur and the German Urheberrecht: authors.26 How can their interests form a basis
for the justification of copyright?
22 Moore, A., 2011. Intellectual Property. In E. N. Zalta, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/intellectual-property/ [Accessed June 
6, 2013].
23 Aigrain. Sharing: Culture and the Economy in the Internet Age, op. cit.
24 Gillespie, T., 2007. Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, p.10.
25 Murphy, D.J., 2012. Are Intellectual Property Rights Compatible with Rawlsian Principles of 
Justice? Ethics and Information Technology, 14(2), pp.109–121.
26 These terms translate as author's rights.
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A successful account based on authorial interests is clearly insufficient for a
conclusive judgement about the morality of copyright. Either authorial interests need
to  be  balanced  against  the  interests  of  the  public  or  the  account  needs  to  be
complemented  by  an  argument  dismissing  the  importance  of  public  interests.
However, it is clear that a successful authorial interest argument for copyright weighs
heavily in favour of copyright regulations.  Himma even thinks any justification of
copyright "clearly depends on whether authors have a moral right in the content of
their creations".27
Authorial interest theories come in a variety of guises. One prominent strand
of thought is formed by those approaches that are based on Locke, and this is the
focus of the present section28. I hope to show that Locke's original theory is fatally
flawed when it comes to justifying copyright and that this flaw is inherited by later
Lockean  theories.  John Locke's  labour  desert  theory of  material  property  can  be
divided into four main parts, which I will shortly sketch here.
According to Locke, God gave the earth to man in common, to be used to their
advantage and convenience.29
(L1) Resources exist to be used by people. 
For a person to enjoy the earth and what  it  produces, she must be able  to
exclude  others  from use of  the  good she  desires.  And in  order  to  exclude  others
legitimately, a person must be the owner of that resource. 
(L2) Enjoyment of a resource requires the ability to exclude others from 
using it; legitimate use requires ownership.
The fundamental question for Locke concerns how initial appropriation can
come  about.  Locke's  starting  point  is  that  human  beings  have  ownership  in
themselves.  This ownership extends not only to the body but also to the activities
undertaken with it, inter alia labour. When working the land, people mix themselves,
in the form of their labour, with the land. By mixing one's labour with the land, the
land becomes an extension of the person and thereby the labourer's property.
(L3) People come to own a resource by mixing their labour with it.
The extent of the acquisition of property is however limited by two conditions.
(L1) and (L2) postulate that resources are appropriated to be enjoyed – consequently
appropriation that goes beyond what can be enjoyed is illegitimate. In this spirit, the
27  Himma. The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes, op. cit, 
p.1152.
28 In legal theory the Lockean argument has found its expression in the sweat of the brow doctrine. It 
postulates that the effort or investment expended in the creation of a work warrants copyright 
protection. The sweat of the brow doctrine does not require that a work be creative in any way and is 
therefore mainly of historical importance. May, C. & Sell, S.K., 2006. Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Critical History, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
29 Locke, J., 1764. Two Treatises of Government, T. Hollis, ed., London, UK: A. Millar et al, bk. II, ch. 
V.
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first limitation states one may only acquire as much as one can use for oneself – if
appropriation leads to waste it is not legitimate. Secondly, one may only acquire so
much that there is enough and as good left for others after appropriation.
(L4) One may only acquire as much as one can use for oneself and only as
long as there is enough and as good left for others.
Much criticism of Locke focuses on (L3) as it is not at all clear why mixing
one's labour with a resource should lead to an extension of ownership rather than a
loss. Nozick came up with the famous example of someone who throws a can of
tomato juice into the ocean, asking whether this should really be enough to acquire
ownership of the sea.30
Contemporary authors try to remedy this weakness by replacing the idea of the
mixing of labour with other factors deemed morally relevant. Fisher argues that the
expenditure of personal resources or effort gives rise to moral interests in the things
that are thereby created.31 Himma proposes to see time as the crucial resource that is
being used in authorial creation.32 Spinello argues that it is added value that matters.33
Nozick  himself  suppresses  (L3)  entirely  and  simply  states  that  appropriation  is
legitimate up to the level proscribed by (L4).34
All  these  approaches  focus  on  (L3)  or  (L4)  while  crucially  leaving  (L2)
unchanged. But in the case of intellectual resources, it is simply not true that we need
to exclude others in order to enjoy a resource. Copyright protects abstract types, not
material tokens. If I write a book, I do not necessarily become the proprietor of the
physical  book I  write  –  I  might  have  stolen  the  paper  –  but  rather  am accorded
copyright of the text contained therein, that is to say, in the meaningful combination
of the symbols that comprise the text.35 This means what is protected by copyright is
non-rival.  The same abstract  authorial  work can be used by an infinite  amount of
people, without anyone's enjoyment thereby being degraded. In the case of authorial
works use does not require excluding others. Therefore appropriation is not necessary
for legitimate use, and (L2) cannot be employed to justify the necessity to appropriate
authorial works.
The argument so far is not new. Lockean theorists claim to be able to evade
the above challenge concerning (L2) by letting (L3) do all the argumentative work. I
agree that a variant of (L3) can possibly be used to argue why certain people come to
have certain rights to a given resource or authorial work. Maybe creating something
30 Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
31 Fisher, W., 2007. Theories of Intellectual Property. In S. Munzer, ed. New Essays in the Legal and 
Political Theory of Property. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 168–199.
32 Himma. The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes, op. cit.
33 Spinello, R.A., 2003. The Future of Intellectual Property. Ethics and Information Technology, 5(1), 
pp.1–16.
34 Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, op. cit.
35 In fact, what is protected by copyright is not even the meaningful combination of symbols but some 
meaning of this combination of symbols. This explains why a translation of a work is also covered by 
copyright – even though the meaningful symbols are entirely different, the meaning of the symbols 
remains. The fact that meaning and expression cannot be easily differentiated is at the root of the 
difficulties regarding the idea/expression dichotomy.
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valuable does create rights. The crux of the matter however is that not only authors
create value with regard to authorial works. In fact none of the proposals for (L3) is
limited to authors. Someone can interpret an authorial work and add value, someone
can laboriously copy it, or spend huge amounts of time carefully reading it. Without
(L2) justifying why authors need to be able to exclude others from using their works,
all these people should be accorded rights, too.
There are two steps to the problem. Firstly, the inapplicability of (L2) leads to
the loss of an argument for one essential aspect of the notion of property: exclusivity.
Secondly, all proposed replacements of (L3) fail at restricting rights to only those who
create a work, namely those that we commonly consider to be authors. And this is
why all Lockean theories fail.36
An objection  to  my argument  is  expressed  by Spinello  and Bottis.37 Their
Lockean approach emphasises the idea that violating copyright harms owners. They
base this argument on Locke's no harm principle.38 But what is the harm involved
when a person uses another's work without their authorisation? Clearly, the harm in
question cannot come from inability to enjoy the work – no such harm exists with
non-rival authorial works. Could it be harm to the ability to monetise the work? As I
have shown in the section on public interest accounts, copyright is neither very good
at  ensuring  this  ability  nor  does  it  provide  the  only  way  of  monetising  authorial
works. Furthermore, we do not always protect people's ability to make money, and we
would therefore need an argument why such protection is warranted in the case of
authors. Nonetheless, I think the notion of harm is relevant to our case. I will explore
this idea in the next sections but as you will see this means leaving Lockean theories
behind.
The failure of Lockean theories holds a promise. If we find a morally valuable
feature unique to authorship, we can let (L3) hold the whole argumentative weight
without needing to be supported by (L2). This will furthermore enable us to see what
harm authors may expose themselves to when publishing their works.
Personality Interest
Personality interest theorists think they know what feature of the creation of
works gives rise to authorial interests, and they think this feature can take on all the
argumentative  weight.  In  this  section  I  introduce  the  personality  interest  account,
sketch how authors come to acquire such an interest, and argue why it merits being
protected.
The personality argument under its many guises takes inspiration from Hegel39
and sometimes Kant40. What unites these approaches is the "idea that an individual
enjoys an exclusive moral claim to the acts  and content  of his  or her personality,
36 Locke applied his theory only to material goods and can therefore not be blamed for the failure of 
Lockean theories on copyright.
37 Spinello, R.A. & Bottis, M., 2009. A Defense of Intellectual Property Rights, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar.
38 Locke. Two Treatises of Government, op. cit., bk. II, ch. II.
39 For example : Hughes, J., 1998. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual 
Property. Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 16, pp.81–181.
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personality  being  understood  to  include  a  variety  of  character  traits,  dispositions,
preferences, experiences, and knowledge".41 Many authors stress the importance of
external objects in people's quests for self-actualisation and for the development of
their own personalities.42 In order to become who we want to be, to develop life plans
and follow them through, we need to control external resources. Authorial works are
crucial for personal self-actualisation and therefore merit being protected.
Personality interests are diverse and not exclusively authorial.  Many people
see for example their wedding rings as integral to their personalities. Therefore an
authorial  personality  interest  account  needs  to  show what  interests  are  specific  to
authors and why these trump other people's interests in authorial works.
What personality interests  could be exclusive to authors? Hughes has three
proposals:  sourcehood interests,  intentionality  interests,  and creativity  interests.43 I
will  not  discuss  the  first  two44 as  their  scope is  larger  than  what  is  protected  by
copyright. The third is however promising; creativity is an important aspect of the
definition of the legal subject matter of copyright, and – as we will see – it is closely
connected to our personality.  In order to illustrate how creativity can underpin the
moral justification of copyright, I will first explain what I mean by creativity, then
shed some light on the connections between creativity, personal input, and personality
interest.
The  seminal  case  Feist  Publications,  Inc. v. Rural  Telephone  Service  Co.,
decided by the US supreme court in 1991, illustrates the legal notion of creativity. The
matter of contention was an alphabetical list of telephone numbers compiled by Rural,
the  entries  of  which  were  copied  by  Feist  and  published  in  their  own telephone
directory. Rural consequently sued Feist alleging copyright infringement, prompting
Feist  to  challenge  the  copyrightability  of  the  work  in  question.  This  question  of
copyrightability – and not the matter of copyright infringement – forms the core of the
case.  The  US  Supreme  Court  decided  in  Feist's  favour,  arguing  that  a  simple
alphabetical ordering of telephone numbers, as in Rural's directory, does not display
any creativity and is therefore not copyrightable.
While  Feist v. Rural is intuitively comprehensible, it is very difficult to put
one's finger on what exactly makes something creative. I will rather inelegantly evade
this problem and adopt Hughes (lack of an) explanation. Hughes states that in some
cases we cannot ascribe an object's coming into existence to external factors, which
we perceive as mechanistic or random.45 In these cases a person is responsible for
40 For example : Lucibella, C., 2010. Filesharing and Ownership of Digital Objects: Intellectual 
Property according to Kant’s Theory of Possession. Theoretical and Applied Ethics, 1(1), pp.35–40.
41 Himma. The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes, op. cit., 
p.1155.
42 ibid. Hughes. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, op. cit. Rawls,
J., 2000. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy B. Herman, ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. Resnik. A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property, op. cit.
43 Hughes. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, op. cit.
44 Sourcehood interest denotes the interests we may have in objects when we have been implicated in
the causal chain of events that has brought them into existence. Intentionality interests are interests 
in objects that we have intentionally brought into existence.
45 ibid.
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creating said object because this person's personal input explains why the object has
come into existence. In the following, I will simply assume that personal input exists
and that a certain degree of it is necessary to call an activity and the product thereof
creative. Let us furthermore assume that creativity adequately tracks who is to count
as  an  author,  that  is  to  say,  that  an  appropriate  level  of  personal  input  defines
creativity, which in turn defines what is an original work and who is an author.
So far I have linked authorship to creativity and creativity to personal input.
However, the connection between personal input and personality interest still needs to
be  explicated.  Authors  are  divided  on  whether  personal  input  necessarily  implies
involvement of the author's personality. Some authors, such as Dewey46, claim that all
creative endeavours are marked by our interests, whereas others, such as Hughes47
argue that some authors create original works without these being connected to their
personality.  We  need  not  resolve  this  matter;  even  the  latter  approach  does  not
endanger a personality interest argument for copyright. A proponent of copyright can
argue that  those cases  in  which  authors  do form personality  interests  are  of  such
importance  that  they  merit  offering  copyright  protection  to  all  those  who  might
potentially benefit from it. Summarising the argument thus far, personal input is what
makes works creative and this personal input – at least regularly – leads to the author's
personality being extended to, or expressed in, the works they create.48
Hughes identifies two potential objections to the authorial personality interest
account: "[i]t may be wrong for people to (1) identify with their capacities; and then,
(2) identify with the intellectual products of those capacities".49 I do not believe it can
be wrong for people to identify with their capacities. Individual personal capacities
are  an  essential  part  of  who  we  are.  What  is  more,  also  our  moral  and  political
convictions and our intimate fears and hopes can be expressed in what we create. To
demand  that  people  not  identify  with  these  elements  of  their  personalities  is
tantamount to asking them not to identify with themselves. This is both impossible
and morally wrong.
But why should these personality interests extend to authors' creative works?
Hughes  argues  that  this  is  the  case  because  our  productive  life  –  the  sense  of
imprinting ourselves on the outside world – is essential for our self-actualisation.50
And because an author's ability to develop herself can be harmed when other people
use or modify her works, authors deserve to see their interests protected.
Regulating authorial works
Consequentialism and personality  interest  accounts shed light  on the moral
46 Dewey, J., 1980. Art as Experience, New York: Perigee Books.
47 Hughes. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, op. cit.
48 The idea of an extension of personality also shows that personality interest approaches should not 
be seen as entirely unrelated to Lockean approaches. In fact it is possible to interpret Locke in a way 
that renders his theory to a large extent compatible with a personality interest theory. Hughes – 
quoting Rapaczynski – writes that: "[s]ome writers have suggested that Locke actually subscribed to 
such a personality theory in which 'applying one's labor to a natural object ... endow[s] it with certain 
features pertaining to one’s own form of existence'". ibid., p.28.
49 ibid., p.84.
50 ibid.
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interests authors and the public may have in authorial works. In the remainder of the
paper, I want to explore a minimal set of principles that protect these morally valuable
interests and argue why these are sufficient.
Attribution: authors have the right to be attributed as the authors of their 
works if doing so is possible with reasonable expenditure of resources. 
Attribution ensures that people are recognised for being authors, which can in
itself be a valuable recognition of people's agency.51 Moreover, without attribution it
is difficult  for authors to gain reputation,  which functions as an important form of
social recognition. Human beings are social animals, and without social recognition
most people will fail in their quests for self-actualisation. Social recognition is also
connected to access to material and social resources that are essential to further self-
actualisation.
Attribution does not generally hinder the public's ability to freely use, modify,
and distribute authorial  works. The right of attribution also incentivises authors to
produce  works  and  in  that  sense  advances  the  public  interest.  Moreover,  society
would  be  hard-pressed  to  support  and  recognise  important  contributions  without
knowing who contributed what. However, the public interest in identifying authors
does not justify an obligation to attribute authorial works. Being able to publish works
anonymously can be tremendously important, be it for personal, political, or artistic
reasons. Should authors be able to waive the right of attribution? If authors are not
obliged to use their right of attribution, then I would follow a liberal argument and
claim they should be able to permanently waive that right as well.
The  public  must  try  to  attribute  works  correctly,  which  may  involve
developing schemes that facilitate locating authors and attributing works correctly.
However,  if,  after  expenditure of a reasonable amount  of resources,  it  still  proves
impossible to correctly attribute a work, then the public interest trumps the authorial
interest and the work may be used without attribution.52
Whether  authors  should  be  able  to  transfer  their  right  of  attribution  is  a
delicate matter. On the one hand, an author may be part of a collective desiring to
publish a work as a unified entity. Here, I believe transferring the right of attribution
is  justified.  On the  other  hand,  there  are  instances  where  an  author  may want  to
transfer a work to some person who is disconnected from the production of the work.
In this second case I see transfer as illegitimate, principally because of the public's
interest  in  not  being  deceived  about  who  produced  a  given  work.  The  difficulty
consists in these two cases not always being easily distinguishable.
Non-endorsement: authors have the right of having it clearly stated that a 
use or modification of their work is not endorsed or approved by them.
People who use others' authorial creations must make it clear that their use
51 ibid.
52 Otherwise use of works would be very restricted in practice. A user may for example be unable to 
locate the author of a work because the necessary records do not exist or are very difficult to access. 
Works can also be based on so many prior works that it becomes infeasible to attribute them all.
Int. J. Arts and Technology, Vol. ?, No. ?, 2016
does not necessarily signify endorsement by the original author. Otherwise it might be
thought  that  the  uses  or  modifications  undertaken  were  approved  by  the  original
author, and this can illegitimately reflect back on them. This right complements the
right of attribution and protects authors' correct social recognition. This right should
have no impact on the public's ability to use a work. A user does not even need to
know  a  work's  author  in  order  to  include  a  notice  saying  its  author  does  not
necessarily endorse her use of it. Indeed, if it were generally known that use of a work
does not imply endorsement, including such notices might become unnecessary.
Profit sharing: authors have the right to a fair share of the profits made 
from commercial exploitation of their works.
Profit sharing has the potential of benefiting authors without damaging public
interest. The share of the profits given to authors should be such that commercial use
is not unduly restricted and non-commercial use not affected at all.53 To ensure that
authors  cannot  unduly  leverage  this  principle,  the  share  should  not  be  subject  to
negotiations  between the author  and the commercial  user but set  beforehand by a
competent institution. Such a profit sharing rule should incentivise the production of
authorial works without negatively impacting the public's ability to use, modify, and
share authorial  works.  This  right  is  also in the interests  of  authors.  They gain an
additional means of income and recognition, and their works are protected from being
used to the exclusive financial benefit of others.
For how long should we protect the three rights I have described so far? I do
not know. I believe this matter depends on the structure of the overall legal system, on
the economic situation and system, and other factors. I do not however believe that
the protection should ever be longer than the life of the author. Authors' personality
interests extinguish with their deaths, and it is dubious whether longer-than-life terms
of protection provide any additional incentives to authors.
Alternative compensation systems: authors should be fairly compensated 
for their work.
Profit sharing alone might not be able to provide sufficient financial incentives
to authors. Moreover, authors should be compensated for their contributions to society
and given the means necessary to lead decent lives. At least the latter two of these
matters are not specific to authors; they are concerns about fairness and social justice,
which  apply  to  everyone.  When designing alternative  compensation  systems,  care
should be taken to ensure they fulfil their twin goals of providing financial incentives
and enabling a decent life for authors.
I  believe  these  four  principles  suffice.  Additional  economic  rights  are
unwarranted  from  a  public  interest  perspective  if  authors'  income  and  financial
incentives are guaranteed by profit sharing and alternative compensation systems and
if such rights negatively affect public interests. I believe this is the case at least for all
the  classical  economic  rights.  From a  personality  interest  perspective,  Radin  has
53 I gloss over a significant difficulty here insofar as it is not always easy to distinguish commercial from
non-commercial uses.
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argued that  property rights are a means of recognising authors for their  important
contributions.54 Not giving this point the discussion it deserves, I will only state that I
think there are more valuable forms of recognition that we should espouse instead.
Possible additional moral rights require a more detailed discussion. Authors
may,  for  example,  be  associated  with  uses  of  their  works  even  when  a  non-
endorsement notice is included. This risk is real; however, the danger is minor and no
worse  than  in  the  copyright  system.  Firstly,  most  people  should  take  a  non-
endorsement  clause  at  face  value.  Secondly,  the  danger  of  an  author's  unjustified
association with uses of her work diminishes when authors have less control over
their  works.  When  authors  have  a  high  level  of  control  over  their  works,  not
exercising  their  rights  can  more  plausibly  be interpreted  as  endorsement  as  when
authors lack any ability to control their works. Thirdly, copyright itself cannot ensure
that an author is never unjustifiably associated with uses of her works. One cannot
prohibit people from thinking certain thoughts, and there always exists the possibility
of some people making unjustified  associations  between authors and uses of their
works. Finally, it is not always unjustified to associate an author against her will with
a certain use of her work.
An author  may also feel  that  she loses her ability  to express herself  when
others use her creations in ways she dislikes or even abhors. This may stop her from
trying  to  publicly  express  herself,  which  can  endanger  her  capacity  for  self-
actualisation.  Sometimes  this  situation  is  conceived  of  as  a  conflict  between
competing personality interests: on the one hand there is the author and on the other
the  user  who  tries  to  give  the  work  a  new meaning.  Yet,  such  a  conflict  is  not
necessary as is evidenced by the many authors who renounce the right to control their
creations and who indeed see this as furthering their personality interests.55 I believe
whether or not authors are hurt in this sense by certain uses of their works depends on
the attitudes they have towards their works. If an author does not believe she owns the
work in question, if she understands that she's not the sole source of its meaning, if
she is tolerant of other views, and if she sees authorial works as building on a cultural
commons,  then  uses  she  dislikes  are  less  likely  to  endanger  her  quests  for  self-
actualisation.
Authorial works created by others play important roles in our lives and are
often  integral  to  our  personality  development.  Many  of  us  have  probably  been
significantly influenced by some of the books we read, and it is not uncommon for
this influence to be so strong that it helps define who we are. A person may want to
share with others works they feel express their personalities. In other cases, authorial
works  need  to  be  adapted  to  best  suit  the  individual's  expressive  desires.  Both
modification and distribution may however not be possible since copyright per default
prohibits such uses. Copyright protection therefore often negatively impacts others' –
54 Radin, M.J., 1982. Property and Personhood. Stanford Law Review, 34(5), pp.957–1015.
55 One example is the importance given by the hacker ethics to not restricting access to works and 
information. This is a fundamental part of the hacker identity and evidenced by Free Software. 
Another example are the hugely popular Creative Commons licenses with which authors can forgo 
most of the rights accorded by copyright. For instance Flickr, an image hosting website, holds 350 
million photos with such a license. Chaos Computer Club, CCC | Hackerethik. Available at: 
https://www.ccc.de/de/hackerethik [Accessed January 11, 2016]. Flickr, Flickr: Creative Commons. 
Available at: https://secure.flickr.com/creativecommons/ [Accessed January 11, 2016].
Int. J. Arts and Technology, Vol. ?, No. ?, 2016
both  authors'  and  non-authors'  –  ability  for  self-actualisation  and  "systemically
prevent[s]  prospective  personhood  interests  from  developing"  (emphasis  in  the
original).56
Forms of authorial self-actualisation that build on copyright and thus endanger
others'  quests  for  self-actualisation  can  also  be  seen  as  noxious  and  not  morally
valuable.  If  this  is  correct,  hurting  the  public  would  also  be harmful  to  authorial
personality  interests.  Radin  for  example  argues  that  appropriation  is  "healthy"  –
conducive to valuable self-actualisation – only in those instances where it does not
harm others.57 And in the case of copyright, harming others cannot be escaped without
renouncing one's rights, at least as long as some rights cannot be acquired or some
people lack the necessary financial means therefor.
Both  public  interest  and  personality  interest  accounts  show  that  copyright
necessarily  has  negative  effects  on the public,  whereas  the  effects  on authors  are
neither inevitable nor clearly positive or negative in character. I have also argued that
the  possible  negative  effects  on  authors,  stemming  from  unauthorised  use  or
modification  of  their  works,  depend  on  their  attitudes  towards  their  works.
Renouncing  the  control  over  one's  works  can  even  constitute  a  valuable  part  of
authorial personality. Therefore, if it is possible to change authors' attitudes towards
their creations – which I believe it is – then it is better to bring about such a change
than to insist that the public must be harmed.
Contributors
Until now I have analysed two types of interests: authorial interests and public
interests. These two do not however exhaust all the possible moral interests people
have in authorial works. In this section I explore interests of contributors – people
who are not authors but more involved in the production of works than the public.
Copyright has a place for at least some contributors, regulating authorial rights
in joint or collective works.58 If I contribute a paragraph to a novel, the novel's author
does not hold the copyright in the paragraph in question; this copyright is mine. She
instead holds the copyright in the creative ordering of the different parts of the book
as well as in those parts of the book she authored.
Not  every  type  of  contribution  benefits  from copyright  protection.  Firstly,
some  contributions  are  considered  too  insubstantial  or  too  small  to  be  protected.
Secondly, and more importantly, there are contributions that are far from insubstantial
that also lack protection. For instance, film directors often obtain the copyright and
moral rights in a film, even though there are many others whose contribution is far
from negligibly small. Another example is the master craftsman who fashions a statue
according to an artist's plans and who does not profit from any copyright protection
either.
56 Hughes. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, op. cit.
57 Radin. Property and Personhood, op. cit.
58 A collective work consists of multiple separable parts authored by different parties whereas one 
speaks of a joint work when the individual contributions to a work cannot be separated from each 
other. See for example : Colston, C., 1999. Principles of Intellectual Property Law, London, UK: 
Cavendish.
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It could now be argued that these contributors do not make the cut because
they lack creativity – they merely implement another person's creative idea. While the
truth of this is questionable, protecting contributors does not even require them to be
creative. The various approaches that failed to ground copyright because they applied
not only to authors might justify interests for contributors. It might for example be
argued that the effort that contributors expend gives rise to moral interests. It might
also be reasoned that contributors are justified to personally identify with the creation
of others' authorial works because they have intentionality personality interests in the
work. These personality interests are connected to our intentional actions and their
importance for a person's sense of agency.59
We have seen in earlier sections that personal input and thus creativity are a
matter of degree, and it is therefore difficult to argue why there should be a concrete
cut off point below which no rights at all should be accorded. The difference between
authorial and contributors' interests is one of degree. It is very difficult to say when a
contribution becomes sufficiently creative to merit being called an authorial work on
its  own.  This  leads  me to  agree  with  Hilpinen  who argues  that  it  is  "possible  to
distinguish degrees of authorship" (emphasis original).60 These degrees of authorship
could then be accompanied by degrees of rights.
Would  the  existence  of  contributors'  moral  interests  imply  that  we should
extend the range of people to whom copyright is accorded? I do not think so for a
simple  reason,  which  I  will  not  however  flesh  out  here:  contributors'  personality
interests  are  likely  to  be  less  strong  than  authors'  and  according  copyright  to
contributors could harm the general public by further complicating the legal situation.
Therefore, if authors' should only be granted very limited exclusive rights, then the
case is even more clear-cut with contributors.
I  believe  contributors'  interests  could  lead  us  to  espouse  new  ways  of
attribution that give recognition also to those who are now invisible. One interesting
approach can be seen in Free Software projects, which are often hosted on platforms –
Version Control Systems – that record all the changes made to the source code. Every
contribution is publicly recorded and usually attributable to a specific person. One can
easily find out whether a specific contribution is substantial or not and appraise its
value. By attributing every contribution, such systems render it less important who is
an author and who a contributor, stressing instead the collective nature of creativity.
Conclusion
Valid  authorial  and  public  interests  in  authorial  works  exist.  However,
Lockean approaches cannot even in principle justify exclusive authors' rights. While
consequentialist as well as personality interest  theories can do so, they also fail to
justify copyright.  What consequentialism and personality interests  do justify is the
limited set of rights I have presented towards the end of this paper. In addition, I have
argued that we might need to think of ways to protect the interests of contributors.
59 Hughes. The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, op. cit.
60 Hilpinen, R., 2011. Artifact. In E. Zalta, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/artifact/ [Accessed November 29, 2013], sec. 4.
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This paper has tried to present an overall view of the ethics of copyright. I
have done so because I believe only a pluralist account can allow for judgements on
copyright's moral status. Unfortunately this meant leaving by the wayside many of the
details of the argument. A first inadequacy is that the moral foundations grounding the
interests I have argued for were to a large extent absent. How exactly are authorial
works important for self-actualisation? What values should a consequentialist account
take into consideration? I have also mentioned the importance of authors' attitudes
towards their works without giving this much thought. Virtue ethics, which I have
also ignored, might help in investigating the attitudes authors should hold towards
their works.61 This last point deserves emphasis: we need more research on the nature
and value of the relationship between authors and their works.
I also had to leave aside many additional arguments in favour of my view on
copyright.  Above  all,  the  rich  literature  on  the  value  of  the  commons  and  of
collaborative  creative processes comes to mind.  In general,  my paper has focused
perhaps  too  heavily  on  the  individual,  disregarding  to  what  extent  culture  and
knowledge production are social processes.
My analysis has focused on copyright law. A more complete investigation of
the ethics of authorial works would have to cover additional questions. Not all of the
moral  issues  surrounding  authorial  works  are  codified  and  these  non-legal  areas
would need to be considered, too. I have also not treated the question of when authors
should  –  or  must  –  publish  works  or  refrain  from  doing  so.  Finally,  copyright
interrelates with other spheres of intellectual property – patents and trademarks – and
these interrelations deserve to be analysed.
I hope to see more, and more expansive,  pluralist  analyses of the ethics of
authorial works. The significance of copyright can hardly be understated as it shapes
one of the defining aspects of our humanity: our culture. Given these stakes, I have no
doubt that copyright will remain a domain of heated debates for many years to come.
We need more than that however – we need honest efforts at mutual understanding
and constructive criticism. My hope is that moral philosophers will help making this
extremely important discussion a fruitful one.
 
61 See for example : Benkler, Y. & Nissenbaum, H., 2006. Commons-based Peer Production and 
Virtue. Journal of Political Philosophy, 14(4), pp.394–419.
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